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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
CHRISTIAN V. STATE: THE MITIGATION DEFENSES OF 
HOT-BLOODED RESPONSE TO ADEQUATE 
PROVOCATION AND IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE CAN 
APPLY TO MITIGATE FIRST -DEGREE ASSAULT 
CHARGES. 
By: Jason HeUer 
In a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that, under certain circumstances, the mitigation defenses of hot-
blooded response to legally adequate provocation and imperfect self-
defense may apply to reduce first-degree assault to second-degree 
assault. Christian v. State, 405 Md. 306, 951 A.2d 832 (2008). More 
specifically, the court stated that these mitigation defenses are 
applicable to first-degree assault charges where such assaults would 
supply the underlying malice for a felony-murder charge in the event 
the victim dies. Christian, 405 Md. at 332-33, 951 A.2d at 847-48. 
In the first of two consolidated cases, a dispute arose between 
Daniel Christian ("Christian") and Raynard Moulden ("Moulden") in a 
mall parking lot. Following a verbal altercation between Christian and 
Moulden, a physical struggle ensued, and Christian stabbed Moulden, 
allegedly in self-defense. 
Before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Christian requested 
a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense to mitigate the first-degree 
assault charge. The court denied the request, and the jury convicted 
Christian of first-degree assault and related charges. Christian 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which held that 
the circuit court did not commit reversible error in refusing the 
instruction because an imperfect self-defense instruction is only 
applicable in homicide cases. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to consider this case. 
In the second consolidated case, Kalilah Romika Stevenson 
("Stevenson") drove to her estranged husband's home to retrieve her 
daughter's book bag. While in the home, Stevenson and her mother-
in-law began arguing. Her husband, Antonio Corbin ("Corbin"), 
intervened in an attempt to break up the dispute and sought to forcibly 
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remove Stevenson from his home. Stevenson stabbed Corbin twice in the 
foreann with a butcher knife, allegedly in response to Corbin's use of 
force. 
Stevenson, on trial before the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, 
requested a jury instruction on the mitigation defense of hot-blooded 
response to adequate provocation, which the court denied. The jury found 
Stevenson guilty of fIrst-degree assault and related charges. Stevenson 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed, 
holding that the mitigation defense of hot-blooded response to adequate 
provocation was inapplicable in Stevenson's case because fIrst-degree 
assault was not a shadow offense of murder. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari to consider this case. 
In front of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Christian and Stevenson 
argued that the intent to cause serious physical hann supplies the requisite 
malice to consider fIrst-degree assault a shadow form of murder because it 
shares the malice associated with other shadow offenses such as attempted 
murder, felony-murder, and the inchoate forms of those crimes. Id at 313, 
951 A.2d at 836. Further, Christian and Stevenson contended that fIrst-
degree assault is an underlying crime for felony-murder, and thus 
mitigation defenses should apply. Id at 314, 951 A.2d at 836. 
Conversely, the State asserted that mitigation defenses to negate malice 
are unavailable because the intent and malice requirements for fIrst-degree 
assault are disparate from murder and its shadow forms. Id at 314-15, 
951 A.2d at 837. The court rejected the State's argument, effectively 
altering Maryland's traditional common law. Id at 332-33, 951 A.2d at 
848. 
Historically, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that mitigation 
defenses of hot-blooded response to adequate provocation and imperfect 
self-defense only apply to charges of criminal homicide and its shadow 
forms. Id. at 322, 951 A.2d at 841. Before the General Assembly enacted 
the current assault statutes in 1996, the court expanded the availability of 
the mitigation defenses to charges of assault with the intent to murder. Id 
at 325, 951 A.2d at 843. The difference between the mitigation defense 
for murder and an assault with intent to murder charge is that murder 
would be reduced to manslaughter, whereas an assault with intent to 
murder would be reduced to simple assault. Id at 326, 951 A.2d at 844. 
To determine the applicability of the mitigation defenses to fIrst-degree 
assault, the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined the relationship 
between mitigation and malice. Id at 329, 951 A.2d at 846. The court 
explained that the requisite malice for a murder charge is different than the 
malice required for other crimes. Id (citing Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 
223, 231, 623 A.2d 630, 634 (1993)). The malice element of murder 
encompasses the requisite state of mind, as well as an absence of 
mitigation. Christian, 405 Md. at 329,951 A.2d at 846 (citing Richmond, 
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330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634). However, criminal charges other than 
murder do not require an absence of mitigating circwnstances to satisfy 
the malice element. Christian, 405 Md. at 329, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing 
Richmond, 330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634). The court noted that the use 
of mitigation defenses is specific only to murder charges and its shadow 
forms. Christian, 405 Md. at 329-30, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing Richmond, 
330 Md. at 231,623 A.2d at 634). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland further stated that the purpose of the 
felony-murder doctrine is to deter dangerous acts by charging any 
homicide resulting from the acts as murder, regardless of the offender's 
intent to kill. Christian, 405 Md. at 330, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing Roary v. 
State, 385 Md. 217, 226-27, 867 A.2d 1095, 1100 (2005)). The court 
explained that first-degree assault is within the doctrine's purpose, 
therefore sufficiently serving as an underlying crime to felony-murder. 
Christian, 405 Md. at 330, 951 A.2d at 846 (citing Roary, 385 Md. at 226-
27,867 A.2d at 1100). 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that a 
felony-murder charge is dependent on the malice of the underlying crime 
being applied to the resulting homicide. Christian, 405 Md. at 332, 951 
A.2d at 847. In light of its prior holdings, the court reasoned that first-
degree assault can possess the requisite malice to charge an offender with 
felony-murder if the victim dies. Christian, 405 Md. at 332, 951 A.2d at 
847. Therefore, the court found that under certain circumstances, first-
degree assault constitutes a shadow offense of homicide. Id The court 
thus held that the mitigation defenses of hot-blooded response to adequate 
provocation and imperfect self-defense are applicable to mitigate first-
degree assault charges where the assault would create the requisite malice 
for felony-murder. Id at 332-33, 951 A,2d at 847-48. The court noted 
that the availability of mitigation defenses still does not extend to crimes 
other than murder and its shadow forms; but now, under certain 
circwnstances, first-degree assault is a shadow form of murder. Id. 
By holding that mitigation defenses can be applicable to reduce first-
degree assault charges, the Court of Appeals of Maryland strives to amend 
the incongruity that enables a perpetrator whose victim dies to be 
incarcerated for less time than an offender whose victim lives. The court's 
decision may encourage offenders, who are unaware that mitigation 
defenses are still limited to murder and its shadow forms, to invoke 
mitigation defenses for lesser crimes, resulting in delayed proceedings. 
However, this potential consequence is incomparable to the benefit of 
mending an unjust sentencing incongruity. The decision in Christian will 
encourage courts to be more liberal with the availability of mitigation 
defenses for assault charges. Further, as this is an issue of first impression 
in Maryland, it is plausible to predict that the availability of mitigation 
defenses for assault related charges, under certain circumstances, will 
evolve to include additional variations of assault. 
